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Abstract 
In this paper, we estimate a gravity equation properly accounting for omitted exporter 
and importer’s overall trade resistance, through country-yearly dummies for exporter and 
importer countries. We find that the omission of time-varying multilateral trade resistance 
terms in the estimation of a gravity equation introduces important biases in the results, 
although correcting them means we can only compute differences between actual and 
predicted export shares, instead of levels, as usually done. An application to the calculation 
of trade potentials in the Euromed region (Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries) 
shows that the omission of time-varying multilateral trade resistance terms greatly 
influences the computation of export potentials as well as the estimated effect of signing 
a free trade agreement. Overall, we find that, except for Algeria, Jordan and Lebanon, 
Euromed countries’ share of exports to the EU as a whole is at, or slightly above, those 
predicted by a correctly-specified gravity model, although the share of exports to some 
individual EU countries is significantly below the predictions of the gravity model. Except for 
those three countries, we find significant opportunities for export growth to the US, instead. 
 
JEL classification: F12, F14, F15. 
Keywords: Gravity model, trade potentials, export shares, Euromed. 
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1 Introduction  
International trade economists have been studying the determinants of international bilateral 
trade flows since Tinbergen (1962) introduced the so-called gravity equation and Anderson 
(1979) laid out its theoretical foundation. The theory behind gravity equations includes a 
supply and demand system that leads to the volume of trade between any two countries 
to be directly proportional to their economic mass. It is also inversely related to other 
characteristics that might hamper trade such as distance, the absence of a free trade 
agreement, or other types of bilateral costs, usually referred to as bilateral trade resistance. 
Nevertheless, as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) rightly point out, the volume of trade 
between any two countries depends not only on their level of bilateral trade resistance but 
also on how difficult it is for each of them to trade with the rest of the world —what they term 
multilateral resistance. Higher levels of multilateral resistance should be associated, ceteris 
paribus, with higher bilateral trade volumes. 
In this paper, we argue that the time-varying nature of the multilateral resistance 
terms for different countries should be properly addressed when using panel data to estimate 
a gravity equation. We suggest the inclusion of country-year fixed effects in the estimation, 
in an extension of the methodology proposed by Feenstra (2002) for cross-sectional data. 
We then use the estimated gravity equation to estimate export potentials as the divergence 
between the actual level of exports and that predicted by the model. The standard measure 
of export potential used in the literature, the ratio between actual and predicted trade, 
becomes meaningless in our context. Specifically, including country-year fixed effects in the 
estimation, which solves the potential bias stemming from omitted variables, also implies that 
we fit perfectly each country’s total exports (and imports) in any given year, and thus the ratio 
of actual to predicted total trade in any period is identically equal to 1. This motivates us to 
introduce the concept of export share potential: the ratio of actual to predicted shares of a 
country’s exports to a given destination. Our measure, thus, captures those export 
destinations that are over- or under-represented in a country’s external trade, with the idea 
that the bilateral volume of exports is more likely to increase towards those destinations that 
exhibit an actual export share below those predicted by our model, something that is 
confirmed by the data.1 Another by-product of our approach is that it only allows the 
estimation of in-sample trade potentials, in spite of Egger’s (2002) critique, which calls for 
the correction of as many sources of misspecification as possible. 
In our estimation of the determinants of bilateral export flows, we find that the 
estimated coefficients of explanatory variables that change over time are quite sensitive to 
the inclusion of country-year dummies, which points to the potential bias introduced by not 
including them in the gravity equation. This variability of estimated coefficients is also 
reflected in export potentials that might, in some cases, change dramatically across different 
specifications, and even reverse sign in a few occasions —that is, predicting that export 
shares are higher than the model would predict in one specification, and the opposite in a 
different estimation. Even if export potentials were not to be significantly affected by omitting 
multilateral resistance to trade in the estimation, a proper specification of the gravity equation 
is crucial to correctly capture and understand the marginal effect of time-varying independent 
variables on the volume of bilateral trade. This becomes especially relevant given that the 
                                                                          
1. Of course, the definition of an export share implies that the increase in exports vis-à-vis a particular country, which 
leads to the increase of that particular export share, comes at the expense of the shares of the rest of the world. 
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variables whose coefficients are more sensitive to the proper specification of the model are 
policy variables such as those that capture the effect of the various trade agreements and 
currency unions on bilateral trade flows. 
We apply this general setup to the estimation of export share potentials in Euromed 
countries —countries in the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean.2 According to a 
number of policy reports [see e.g. World Bank (2003)], one of the most important 
development challenges in the region is the creation of enough jobs for a rapidly growing 
work force. Among the possible policy actions to achieve this goal, higher trade integration 
has been put forward as one of the most sustainable, given insufficient domestic and regional 
demand in most cases. Indeed, many countries in the region have sought to strengthen 
their trade with the European Union (EU), their largest export market, through the Euro-Med 
trade agreements, while intraregional trade is being promoted through the Greater-Arab 
Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and the Agadir Agreement. Jordan and the United States have 
signed a free trade agreement, and more such agreements may be forthcoming. 
In the empirical exercise, we pay special attention to the impact of the Barcelona 
process, an effort started in the 90s by the European Union (EU) and a number of these 
countries to create a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area. The main instruments used to 
advance towards the creation of such an FTA are bilateral association agreements with 
the EU (AAEUs) which have come into force with the Palestinian Authority (1997), Tunisia 
(1998), Morocco (2000), Israel (2000), Jordan (2002), Egypt (2004), Algeria (2005), and 
Lebanon (2006). 
Supported by the evolution of trade in Euromed countries, one of the main criticisms 
of the association agreements with the EU is that aggregate trade volumes of these 
countries have not increased as much as it was expected at the time of their signing. 
From our previous discussion about the effect of introducing country-year dummies, 
we know that, unfortunately, our estimated total export volumes will be always equal to actual 
total exports for each country. Thus, our model cannot say whether total exports in Euromed 
countries are above or below what one would expect. However, we are still able to analyze 
whether the geographical composition of these countries’ exports differs from the one 
predicted by a well-specified empirical model, and thus provide an idea which destinations 
might provide higher opportunities for future export growth without any policy change (among 
the ones already considered as an explanatory variable, such as signing a free trade 
agreement). 
This paper finds two important results with respect to exports from Euromed 
countries. First, the impact of Euromed association agreements on their exports to the EU 
depends on whether the specification includes time-varying fixed effects. Estimations 
with country fixed effects or with country dummies that only change over long periods 
typically find a significant negative effect of these agreements on bilateral exports. However, in 
our preferred specification, which includes country-triennial fixed effects, Euromed association 
agreements have not had any statistically significant effect on bilateral trade volumes with 
the EU. The second finding, which does not necessarily follow from the former, is that the 
Euromed agreements have not led to an increase in the share of trade of these countries 
vis-à-vis the European Union. Actually, our findings seem to suggest that, for most Euromed 
countries, the biggest unexploited export market is the United States, rather than the EU as a 
                                                                          
2. More specifically, we focus on Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.  
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whole, although individual EU countries still represent a share of exports significantly 
below that implied by the model. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 sets up the model and 
justifies the introduction of country-year dummies in the estimation of the gravity equation, 
and discusses the construction of export share potentials from estimated export levels. 
Section 3 describes the data and the estimation results, focusing on export share potentials 
for the Euromed region. Section 4 concludes. 
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2 Theory and methodology  
2.1 Theoretical derivation of the gravity equation 
First, we turn to the standard underlying model of the gravity equation, as derived in Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003). Each country produces a fixed quantity of a unique bundle of 
goods. On the demand side, consumers have a CES utility function. Letting xeit denote the 
exports from country e to country i in period t, the consumer in country i (the importer 
country) maximizes the utility function 
1 1 1
( )
σ
σ σ σ
σ σβ
− − −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑eit et eiteU x x ,  (1) 
subject to the budget constraint 
=∑ eit eit it
e
p x y ,  (2) 
where βe(1-σ)/σ can be interpreted as a measure of the number of goods within the bundle 
produced by country e; σ  is the elasticity of substitution between goods from different 
countries and the assumption σ>1 implies that consumers in country i have a preference 
to consume the biggest possible number of varieties; peit is the c.i.f. import price from country 
e to country i at time t, and yit is nominal income in country i at time t. 
International trade is costly and these costs take the so-called “iceberg” form, 
meaning that, at time t, teit units of good from country e need to be shipped in order for one 
unit to reach country i. In this setting, these transportation costs augment country e’s export 
price so that peit=pet·teit where pet is the export producer price and (teti–1) is the amount (paid in 
terms of the good) lost to shipping, which can be interpreted as trade costs. 
The solution to country i’s consumer optimization problem gives rise to an import 
demand equation: 
1 σβ −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
et et eit
eit it
it
p t
x y
P
,  (3) 
where Pit is the ideal price index of country i at time t, given by 
( )
1
11 σσβ −−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑it et et eiteP p t .  (4) 
Imposing market clearance (yet=Σi xeit), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that 
the expression for the bilateral trade flow between country e and country i, can be written as 
1 σ−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
et it eit
eit
wt et it
y y t
x
y P P
,  (5) 
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where ywt is world income. The main insight of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is to point 
out the presence of Pet and Pit in the denominator of (5). They imply that what matters for the 
size of bilateral trade flows is not the absolute level of trade barriers (teit) but bilateral barriers 
between trading partners relative to those they have with respect to the rest of the world, 
captured by their respective overall price indices. Taking logs of equation (5), we obtain the 
following linear relationship: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6ln ln ln ln lnβ β β β β β β η= + + + + + + +eit eit et it wt et it eitx t y y y P P , (6) 
where ηeit is a white noise term. The presence of the unobserved price indices Pet and Pit 
implies that the estimation of the gravity equation (6) without taking them into account incurs 
severe biases, as they would be included in the error term which would, then, be correlated 
with teit, according to equation (4). Therefore, in order to properly estimate equation (6), three 
strategies have been suggested: (i) the use of price index data directly, to approximate 
the price indices [as in Baier and Bergstrand (2001)]; (ii) the estimation of Pet and Pit using a 
multi-step procedure as proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), or (iii) the inclusion 
of exporter and importer dummies in the regression as suggested by Feenstra (2002). 
The problem with the first approach is that published price indexes may not accurately reflect 
all trade costs and they are not available for all countries or for all the time periods in our 
sample. The second approach is rather involved and computationally costly, requiring a 
customized nonlinear-least-squares procedure, so most empirical work has tried to follow 
Feenstra’s suggestion and include country dummies for exporters and importers to account 
for Pet and Pit. We, therefore, implement equation (6) in the following way: 
0 1ln lnβ β ε= + + + +eit eit et it eitx t d d ,  (7) 
where det and dit are time-varying exporter and importer dummies, which also capture the 
effect of importer and exporter’s GDP (yet and yit) and world GDP (ywt) in equation (6).3 
We approximate the bilateral trade resistance variable teit as: 
ln ν= + +αZ γZeit ei eit eitt ,  (8) 
where Zei represents a vector of explanatory variables which depend on the specific ei 
country pair but which are constant over time, and Zeit represents a vector of 
time-and-country-pair varying explanatory variables. We test different specifications of (8) that 
include, among the Zei variables, distance between trading partners, dummies for a common 
land border, a common language, a common colonizer, a current colonial relationship, a past 
colonial relationship, and an index of religious similarity (see data appendix for details on 
the construction of these variables). Among the Zeit variables, we include dummies for 
membership in the same free trade area and the same currency union as well as dummies 
to account for the trade creation and trade diversion effects of trade agreements and 
currency unions on non-member countries.4 Notice that, once we introduce country-year 
dummies det and dit, these capture all the effect of any exporter-time or importer-time specific 
                                                                          
3. Notice that, although equation (5) would imply that β2=β3=1, Anderson (1979) shows that the presence of 
non-tradables would imply coefficients lower than unity. In those cases where we illustrate the effect of excluding the 
country-year dummies det and dit, we estimate β2 and β3 instead of imposing the above restriction. 
4. In particular for each free trade agreement we analyze, we consider a dummy when both countries are in the 
same FTA, another dummy when only the exporter is a member of that FTA and a third one when only the importer 
belongs to that FTA. 
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components included in equation (6), such as their respective GDPs and world income, but 
also other variables that have traditionally been introduced in the specification of (8) such 
as land area, and their landlocked or island status as well as other factors which are harder 
to account for such as the importance of the tradable sector and the degree of home bias in 
each country.  
Substituting equation (8) into (7), the gravity equation we take to the data is given by: 
ln ε= + + + +bZ cZeit ei eit et it eitx d d .  (9) 
It is worthwhile pointing out that, unlike most empirical studies, that focus exclusively 
on the average volume of trade between any two countries and where, therefore, each 
country pair is only represented by one observation, we consider directional bilateral trade 
flows. In other words, for every country pair, e and i, we consider not only exports from 
country e to country i (xeit) but also exports from country i to country e (xiet). This approach 
allows us to avoid a possible misspecification error stemming from taking the logarithm of 
the average of two highly asymmetrical trade flows between two countries (as it might be the 
case for those bilateral relationships that exhibit a large trade deficit or surplus). Another 
advantage of considering directional flows is that they allow us to estimate potential trade 
creation and trade diversion effects arising from the creation of free trade areas and currency 
unions. 
2.2 Computation of trade potentials 
The literature on trade potentials usually defines bilateral export potentials as the difference 
between actual exports and the level of exports that would be expected given the 
characteristics of the country pair, that is, the level of trade predicted by a properly specified 
empirical gravity model. Following our notation, the traditional definition of export potential 
XeitP could be [see e.g. de Benedictis and Vicarelli (2005)] 
ln
ln
= eit
eit
x
P
eit
x
eX
e
,  (10) 
where ln x  is the predicted log of (the level of) exports, from the estimation of the gravity 
equation (9). Values of XeitP below 1 would imply that observed exports from country e to 
country i are below what one should expect given their individual and bilateral characteristics. 
Constructing an analog measure of export potential for total trade for a given 
exporter e is not straightforward. Given that in our estimation we obtain the predicted 
log of exports ( ln eitx ) and not the predicted level of exports, we could construct the analog 
of (10) for total exports for country e to the rest of the world: 
ln
ln
ln
∑
= ∑
eit
i
xeit
i
x
P
eWt
e
eX
e
  (11) 
However, a conceptual paradox arises with the use of this measure. The inclusion of 
country-year exporter dummies (det) in our estimation implies that the sum (across all partners) 
of predicted log of exports ( )ln∑ eiti x  should necessarily be equal to the sum of the log of 
actual exports ( )ln∑ eiti x . Thus, in the context of our estimated gravity model (9), we should 
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expect an index of export potentials with respect to all partners (i.e. the world) to be equal to 
one. Note, however, that we fit the log of exports and not exports when estimating (9). 
Jensen’s inequality implies that 
lnln ∑<∑ eiteit i xxi e e , thus, the estimated measure of export 
potential with respect to the world (XeWtP) in equation (11) is, in general, different from one, 
even when the presence of exporter-year dummies (det) should, in theory, allow us to perfectly 
predict total exports for each origin country e every year t: 
ln
ln ln
lnln
1
∑ ∑
= ≠ =∑∑
eit eit
i i
xeit eit
ii
x x
P
eWt
xe
e eX
ee
  (12) 
Given this shortcoming, and the fact the use of exporter-year dummies only allows 
us to predict deviations from average exports, we still estimate the gravity equation (9) in 
log-levels but modify our index of trade potentials to show deviations from predicted shares of 
destination market i on total exports of country e. Given that we consider departures from 
predicted shares and not from levels of exports, we find it more meaningful to compute the 
difference between the actual share of exports to destination country i minus the predicted 
share of exports: 
ln
ln
ln ln ln ln
ln ln
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑= − = −∑ ∑ ∑
xeiteit eit eit
i
xeit eit
i
i
x x x e
PS eit
eit x e eit
i
xe eX e
x
e e
 (13) 
where ln x  is still the predicted log of (the level of) bilateral exports, which is used to construct 
predicted export shares 
lnln
ln ∑ xeiteit i exe e . Notice that now the export share potential to the 
world is always equal to 0 (i.e. actual share of exports to the world and the predicted share 
are both equal to one) as would be expected: 
ln
ln
ln ln
ln ln
0
∑ ∑
= − =∑ ∑
xeit
eit
i i
xeit eit
i
i
x e
PS
eWt x e
e eX
e e
 (14) 
When computing trade potentials as in equation (10) or (13) one could, in principle, 
use an in-sample or an out-of-sample prediction of trade flows. Although the use of 
in-sample predictions for trade potentials is criticized by Egger (2002), we use them instead 
of out-of-sample predictions for two reasons. First, given that the econometric specification 
calls for the use of country-year dummies, it would be obviously impossible to perform 
an out-of-sample estimation. Second, as pointed out by de Benedictis and Vicarelli (2005), 
the use of out-of-sample estimates of trade could also be biased if the gravity equation 
estimated with the benchmark countries is misspecified, so there is no obvious advantage to 
the use of out-of-sample predictions. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO N.º 0720 
3 Data and estimation results 
3.1 Trade in Euromed countries 
In the empirical exercise, we conduct the estimation of the gravity equation (9) for a large 
number of countries but we concentrate on the evolution of export potentials for Euromed 
countries —countries in the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean. What are the 
main characteristics of the evolution of trade for these countries? In the last 30 years it has 
been broadly characterized by a relative stagnation of their trade openness and a continued 
reliance on the EU as the main destination for their exports. 
 
                     Figure 1: Trade integration in emerging regions 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Trade integration of Mediterranean countries 
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                             Figure 3: Intraregional Trade 
 
 
Despite some policy initiatives geared towards increasing their trade with the EU and 
fostering intraregional trade, figure 1 shows that trade integration (measured as the sum of 
exports and imports as percentage of GDP) of the Euromed region has remained stable while 
in the rest of emerging regions has increased throughout the sample (especially more so in 
East Asia). Figure 2 decomposes the evolution of this ratio for Euromed countries by dividing 
them into three categories: resource-rich countries (Algeria, Libya, and Syria), resource-poor 
countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia) and high income countries (Israel). 
For these countries, trade integration increased in the early 70’s mostly thanks to the increase 
in oil prices that raised the value of exports as well as the volume of imports of resource-rich 
countries in the group, even though resource-poor countries also followed a similar pattern. 
After a pronounced fall in the beginning of the 80s, only resource-poor countries seem to 
have returned to the openness levels of the end of the 70s. Even if we consider intraregional 
trade, it has not increased beyond the levels reached in the 60s, as opposed to the advance 
of intraregional trade in the EU, the Americas and East Asia (see figure 3), perhaps in part due 
to the earlier creation of free trade agreements in those regions. There has been, however, 
some advance in trade integration with other countries in the Middle East outside Euromed 
countries (see table 1 below). 
Trade in Euromed countries is also characterized by its geographic concentration. 
Table 1 shows the geographic destination of exports from the main emerging regions 
in 1976 and 2005. Two facts stand out from that table. First, industrial countries in Europe 
(mostly the EU) are the main destination of exports from the region, purchasing around half 
of them. This puts the Euromed region as one of the emerging areas more dependent 
on the EU for foreign demand, only behind Eastern and Central Europe. Second, in the 
last 30 years, the region has even slightly increased its reliance on the EU as export 
destination (with the exception of Israel, which has diversified away from Europe to the US) 
in a process similar to other emerging economies, which have also increased its reliance 
on an area as destination for its exports. As opposed to the Euromed region, however, 
most of the other emerging areas have switched the main destination of their exports to a 
different region in the last 30 years. 
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Table 1 
 
Geographic Destination of exports in 1976 and 2005
Share of total exports, unless otherwise specified.
Destination
Country
WORLD   
(USD mill.)
All Industrial 
Countries
Industrial 
Europe
North 
America
Asia and 
Pacific
Africa Asia Europe Middle East
Latin 
America
Area not 
specified
Euromed Countries 3217 66.99 46.50 18.53 1.95 1.97 2.58 14.32 4.33 2.23 1.52
Resource- Poor 1171 46.86 40.45 4.00 2.41 2.87 2.97 25.03 6.63 2.38 2.79
Resource- Rich 5641 87.82 53.15 33.81 0.85 0.66 0.65 5.99 1.67 1.91 0.56
High Income 2415 69.84 45.96 19.73 4.12 3.19 7.99 3.03 5.00 2.80 0.07
Eastern and Central Europe 4 5666 36.80 31.93 4.09 0.79 0.86 1.37 29.70 4.98 0.73 5.66
East Asia 5 3103 33.05 6.78 11.91 14.32 0.65 7.37 0.39 1.80 1.49 0.02
Latin America 4 6678 67.53 31.62 29.75 6.14 2.22 1.38 6.89 2.57 16.56 1.47
All developing Countries 251516 66.05 32.85 20.65 12.39 2.12 8.24 7.31 3.85 7.96 1.18
Destination
Country
WORLD   
(USD mill.)
All Industrial 
Countries
Industrial 
Europe
North 
America
Asia and 
Pacific
Africa Asia Europe Middle East
Latin 
America
Area not 
specified
Euromed Countries 168548 66.57 50.06 17.60 0.93 3.53 6.40 4.46 12.14 2.68 0.14
Resource- Poor 41783 60.89 56.00 10.15 0.94 5.33 6.80 3.71 14.65 1.73 0.02
Resource- Rich 84252 74.25 53.28 20.85 0.11 1.63 2.01 4.64 13.09 3.98 0.39
High Income 42514 69.30 20.18 37.58 2.85 1.42 15.47 6.83 0.49 3.11 0.00
Eastern and Central Europe 4 302881 65.93 60.07 4.53 0.63 1.80 2.06 21.13 6.44 0.83 0.01
East Asia 5 1383377 51.31 17.01 20.97 13.38 2.10 35.65 4.37 3.31 2.98 0.18
Latin America 4 417071 60.16 16.05 41.12 2.85 2.32 10.78 2.68 3.03 19.53 0.19
All developing Countries 4435360 51.94 26.04 20.13 8.40 2.20 28.37 7.55 3.84 4.33 0.10
Euromed countries:
Resource-Poor: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon; Resource-Rich: Algeria, Libya and Syria; Median Income: Israel
Note: East Asia 4: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of Korea and Thailand.
Eastern and central Europe 4: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Turkey.
Latin America 4: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
Source: DOTS, IMF 2006.
1976
2005
Emerging EconomiesIndustrial Countries
Industrial Countries Emerging Economies
 
 
3.2 Data and estimation of the gravity equation 
Our original dataset includes bilateral trade flows for a total of 205 countries from 1948 
to 2005 (although with many missing observations). Unfortunately, the use of country-year 
dummies in our specification makes it computationally unfeasible to include all countries 
and all years. We therefore restrict our sample to include a subset of the top 100 exports 
(by total exports) in 2004, as well as the Euromed countries that are the subject of our study. 
This implies that our dataset contains 102 countries that, together, cover over 98.4% of 
reported world trade for 2004.5 For computational purposes, we also shorten the time 
dimension of the panel to the last 30 years of data, that is, from 1976 to 2005. The data 
is described in more detail in the data appendix. 
A number of studies [e.g. Nugent (2002); Péridy (2005a and b), and Soderling (2005)] 
have tried to ascertain the trade potential of the Euromed region. Unfortunately, to our 
knowledge, none of them have properly accounted for the possible bias introduced by 
the potential omission of Pet and Pit through the use of country-year dummies, as we do in this 
paper. Most studies introduce time dummies (dt), together with country dummies (de and di), 
which, of course, fail to capture the (potentially diverging) evolving nature of total trade 
resistance captured by the exporter and importer price indexes. This potential bias 
presumably becomes larger the longer the time span used by the study. 
Another feature of our estimation of the gravity equation (9) is the inclusion in the set 
of bilateral characteristic that change over time (Zeit) of a large array of dummy variables for 
                                                                          
5. Lebanon and Cyprus are not among the world’s top 100 exporters but they are included in our sample. The former 
is one of the Euromed countries, the focus of out study, whereas the latter is an important trading partner for some of 
the countries in the group. In some regressions presented later, as a robustness check, we restrict the sample even 
further, to the 70 top exporters plus Euromed countries. Even with that further restriction to 70 countries, we still cover 
well over 96% of total world trade for 2004. 
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different trade agreements.6 The potential trade creation and trade diversion effects following 
the creation of free trade areas (FTAs) is something stressed by the literature on the formation 
of free trade areas. There are three possible effects to be considered: trade creation inside 
the newly created FTA, trade diversion from outside the FTA and also a possible trade 
creation outside the FTA. In the first case, trade increases among members of an FTA as the 
mutual import tariffs fall to zero, the usual trade creation effect. Second, it could be the case 
that the increase in trade within the agreement could come at the expense (act as a 
substitute) of trade with countries outside the free trade area depending on specialization 
patterns, absolute and comparative advantage, and the different elasticities of substitution 
among goods produced in different countries. This second effect corresponds to what has 
been termed as the trade diversion effect. Finally, if by entering a FTA a country is forced to 
adopt a common external tariff that is lower than his current tariff to a non-member of the 
FTA, we could also observe trade creation not only inside an FTA, but outside as well.7 
Therefore, from a global perspective, the total trade creation and welfare effects of a free 
trade area hinges on the combined importance of all three effects. With these effects in mind, 
we make an attempt to capture both trade creation and trade diversion effects by including 
three dummy variables for each agreement. The first dummy variable takes a value of 1 when 
both trading partners have signed a free trade agreement and it captures the trade creation 
effects inside an FTA. The second binary variable takes a value of one when only the exporter 
is in an FTA, to capture the trade diversion effect of its creation. Finally, a third dummy 
variable takes value of 1 if only the importer is in an FTA, to measure the possible trade 
creation effect for a partner outside an FTA. Notice that previous studies that attempted 
to capture trade creation or trade diversion effects of Euromed association agreements 
with the EU could not capture these three different effects as they aggregated bilateral 
exports and imports for each country pair [e.g. Nugent (2002)] whereas we keep two 
observations (exports in each direction) for every country-pair and year. 
One way to assess the potential bias of not considering multilateral trade resistance 
terms in the estimation of a gravity equation is to compare its parameter estimates with the 
case of a properly specified model. To this end, we present in tables 2 and 3 the estimated 
coefficients for gravity equations that do not include multilateral trade resistance terms, in a 
similar way to Nugent (2002), Péridy (2005a and b) and Soderling (2005). More formally, 
table 2 displays the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression (we use the term pooled to 
refer to regressions that do not include any kind of fixed effects). Table 3, in turn, shows the 
coefficients of an OLS regression including only exporter, importer and time dummies 
(de, di and dt). In other words, tables 2 and 3 report, respectively, the estimation of the 
following gravity equations: 
ln ε= + + +1 2 3 4a Z + a Z + a Z + a Z bZ cZeit e i et it ei eit eitx  (15) 
ln ε= + + + + + +3 4a Z + a Z bZ cZeit et it ei eit e i t eitx d d d  (16) 
where Ze and Zi include exporter and importer’s time invariant characteristics (such as land 
area, coastline length, and whether they are an island or landlocked) and Zet and Zit include 
exporter and importer time-varying characteristics, such as GDP or population. The inclusion 
                                                                          
6. The complete list of trade agreements together with its members and its signing date are available in the data 
appendix. 
7. Countries forming a FTA could also experience an increase in their imports from non-members if trading costs are 
mostly sunk: once an exporter has incurred the expenses associated with satisfying common regulations for one of 
the members of the FTA it automatically can start exporting to other members of the FTA as well. 
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of the exporter and importer dummies in equation (16) means that we cannot include exporter 
and importer characteristics (Ze and Zi) as we did in the pooled regression model described 
by equation (15). 
In both tables 2 and 3, the left half (regressions 1 to 4) estimate a gravity model 
with 30 years of data and different number of countries included in the sample (70, 100, 150 
or 205).8 The right half of both tables (regressions 5 to 8) repeats these estimations, with 
different number of countries, for a longer time span, from 1948 to 2005. 
Table 2. Estimates from a pooled OLS regression without fixed effect (equation 15) 
 
OLS regressions
Pooled regression, without fixed effects
Dependent variable: Log of exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance (log) -0.943*** -1.056*** -1.094*** -1.111*** -0.827*** -0.964*** -1.006*** -1.028***
(0.091) (0.029) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.021)
Common border dummy -0.280 0.451*** 0.601*** 0.600*** 0.468*** 0.428*** 0.576*** 0.573***
(0.334) (0.113) (0.099) (0.090) (0.114) (0.107) (0.092) (0.084)
Common country dummy excluded excluded 0.034 -0.066 excluded excluded 0.307 0.294
(0.371) (0.350) (0.308) (0.287)
Ever in colonial relationship 0.762*** 1.044*** 1.210*** 1.393*** 0.999*** 1.136*** 1.306*** 1.446***
     dummy (0.277) (0.101) (0.093) (0.085) (0.116) (0.100) (0.092) (0.083)
Common language dummy 0.035 0.338*** 0.390*** 0.370*** 0.377*** 0.361*** 0.437*** 0.433***
(0.176) (0.055) (0.044) (0.040) (0.065) (0.052) (0.042) (0.038)
Common colonizer dummy 0.053 0.778*** 0.584*** 0.629*** 0.580*** 0.717*** 0.550*** 0.596***
(0.297) (0.102) (0.071) (0.060) (0.159) (0.098) (0.068) (0.057)
Exporter's GDP (log) 1.491*** 1.005*** 0.976*** 0.976*** 0.947*** 1.022*** 0.989*** 0.975***
(0.087) (0.024) (0.017) (0.015) (0.027) (0.022) (0.016) (0.015)
Importer's GDP (log) 1.061*** 0.785*** 0.799*** 0.805*** 0.726*** 0.799*** 0.814*** 0.810***
(0.101) (0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014)
Exporter's Popul. (log) -0.434*** -0.124*** -0.096*** -0.115*** -0.121*** -0.168*** -0.137*** -0.136***
(0.085) (0.024) (0.018) (0.016) (0.026) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015)
Importer's Popul. (log) -0.352*** -0.023 -0.030* -0.063*** -0.023 -0.048** -0.057*** -0.075***
(0.094) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014)
Both countries in EU -2.579*** 2.854*** 2.567*** 2.191*** 2.368*** 3.181*** 2.949*** 2.614***
(0.706) (0.205) (0.195) (0.190) (0.207) (0.201) (0.192) (0.187)
Only exporter in EU -1.478*** 1.571*** 1.373*** 1.160*** 1.064*** 1.699*** 1.552*** 1.371***
(0.496) (0.148) (0.133) (0.124) (0.145) (0.147) (0.132) (0.124)
Only importer in EU -1.712*** 0.790*** 0.743*** 0.678*** 0.476*** 1.070*** 1.070*** 1.031***
(0.474) (0.145) (0.136) (0.130) (0.152) (0.142) (0.133) (0.128)
3.383*** 0.233* 0.458*** 0.696*** 0.775*** 0.010 0.187* 0.414***
(0.521) (0.120) (0.116) (0.112) (0.119) (0.116) (0.112) (0.109)
1.862*** 0.321*** 0.480*** 0.526*** 0.817*** 0.217** 0.345*** 0.381***
(0.405) (0.090) (0.080) (0.075) (0.077) (0.090) (0.079) (0.074)
1.994*** 0.215** 0.349*** 0.367*** 0.515*** 0.037 0.128 0.136*
(0.344) (0.091) (0.084) (0.080) (0.096) (0.087) (0.081) (0.077)
-0.080 -1.516*** -1.348*** -1.156*** -1.449*** -1.648*** -1.514*** -1.306***
(0.243) (0.128) (0.123) (0.122) (0.136) (0.129) (0.125) (0.124)
0.303 -0.747*** -0.649*** -0.574*** -0.767*** -0.823*** -0.751*** -0.675***
(0.191) (0.090) (0.083) (0.078) (0.104) (0.091) (0.083) (0.079)
0.692*** 0.030 0.031 -0.016 0.014 -0.060 -0.099 -0.149*
(0.195) (0.086) (0.082) (0.080) (0.095) (0.087) (0.082) (0.080)
Both countries in Euro Area -0.552*** 0.395*** 0.377*** 0.344*** 0.393*** 0.386*** 0.372*** 0.345***
(0.134) (0.121) (0.121) (0.123) (0.116) (0.123) (0.122) (0.122)
Only exporter in Euro Area -0.214* 0.376*** 0.360*** 0.281*** 0.392*** 0.324*** 0.294*** 0.213***
(0.122) (0.050) (0.045) (0.042) (0.057) (0.052) (0.046) (0.042)
Only Importer in Euro Area 0.165 0.295*** 0.297*** 0.237*** 0.290*** 0.197*** 0.195*** 0.133**
(0.161) (0.060) (0.056) (0.053) (0.071) (0.062) (0.058) (0.054)
Constant -33.249*** -23.980*** -23.812*** -23.018*** -22.734*** -24.265*** -23.981*** -23.150***
(1.801) (0.490) (0.392) (0.339) (0.519) (0.455) (0.373) (0.329)
Observations 6940 172732 254117 314942 141694 212581 311570 381228
R-squared 0.73 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59
Initial year in sample 1976 1976 1976 1976 1948 1948 1948 1948
Final year in sample 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005
Number of countries 70 100 150 205 70 100 150 205
Also included dummies for other free-trade agreements:
           US-Israel, US-Chile, NAFTA, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, EFTA, CAN, CACM, CER and AFTA
Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair) in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Both countries are members of an
EU - Euromed agreement
Only exporter is a member of an
EU - Euromed agreement
Only importer is a member of an
EU - Euromed agreement
Both countries are members of an 
EU association agreement
Only exporter is a member of an
EU association agreement
Only importer is a member of an 
EU association agreement
 
                                                                          
8. In this case we can include up to 205 countries (the maximum number in our sample) given that the number 
of dummies is significantly reduced by considering country dummies (fixed over time). 
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Table 3. Estimates from a OLS regression with exporter, importer, and time 
dummies (equation 16) 
 
OLS regressions
Including exporter and importer fixed effects and time dummies
Dependent variable: Log of exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance (log) -1.316*** -1.307*** -1.321*** -1.378*** -1.170*** -1.156*** -1.169*** -1.226***
(0.027) (0.035) (0.026) (0.022) (0.025) (0.030) (0.023) (0.020)
Common border dummy 0.042 0.350*** 0.562*** 0.697*** 0.036 0.282*** 0.461*** 0.582***
(0.110) (0.107) (0.089) (0.082) (0.099) (0.099) (0.082) (0.075)
Common country dummy excluded excluded 0.809* 1.827*** excluded excluded 0.711 1.631***
(0.481) (0.556) (0.536) (0.556)
Ever in colonial relationship dummy 0.785*** 1.057*** 1.193*** 1.435*** 1.050*** 1.259*** 1.377*** 1.567***
(0.115) (0.103) (0.091) (0.081) (0.123) (0.104) (0.094) (0.083)
Common language dummy 0.519*** 0.418*** 0.380*** 0.308*** 0.418*** 0.335*** 0.337*** 0.285***
(0.060) (0.051) (0.039) (0.035) (0.053) (0.046) (0.036) (0.032)
Common colonizer dummy 0.550*** 0.811*** 0.867*** 0.862*** 0.477*** 0.775*** 0.851*** 0.873***
(0.123) (0.078) (0.056) (0.047) (0.111) (0.074) (0.053) (0.045)
Both countries in EU 0.333* 0.377** 0.105 0.008 1.030*** 1.236*** 0.750*** 0.559***
(0.174) (0.173) (0.166) (0.167) (0.168) (0.158) (0.155) (0.157)
Only exporter in EU 0.137 0.282*** 0.166* 0.099 0.605*** 0.868*** 0.655*** 0.553***
(0.109) (0.099) (0.089) (0.090) (0.109) (0.104) (0.092) (0.090)
Only importer in EU -0.098 0.138 0.137 0.133 0.054 0.366*** 0.298*** 0.270***
(0.120) (0.106) (0.098) (0.095) (0.120) (0.106) (0.102) (0.097)
-0.215* -0.069 -0.026 -0.009 -0.316*** -0.255*** 0.057 0.096
(0.112) (0.114) (0.108) (0.109) (0.099) (0.089) (0.087) (0.088)
0.119* 0.102 0.190*** 0.166*** 0.151** -0.003 0.195*** 0.164***
(0.072) (0.066) (0.059) (0.058) (0.066) (0.065) (0.056) (0.054)
0.223** 0.093 0.058 0.053 0.023 -0.107 -0.031 -0.021
(0.088) (0.077) (0.069) (0.066) (0.082) (0.068) (0.065) (0.061)
-0.131 -0.340*** -0.167** -0.021 -0.356*** -0.445*** -0.102 0.070
(0.093) (0.087) (0.081) (0.080) (0.101) (0.094) (0.089) (0.088)
0.109 0.039 0.081 0.153*** -0.028 -0.069 0.041 0.106*
(0.073) (0.065) (0.058) (0.057) (0.079) (0.071) (0.064) (0.062)
0.126** 0.011 0.015 -0.006 0.093 0.026 0.055 0.033
(0.064) (0.058) (0.054) (0.053) (0.074) (0.067) (0.063) (0.061)
Both countries in Euro Area 0.188** 0.080 0.161 0.177 0.539*** 0.513*** 0.679*** 0.655***
(0.087) (0.096) (0.107) (0.111) (0.085) (0.090) (0.097) (0.101)
Only exporter in Euro Area 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.188*** 0.161*** 0.361*** 0.385*** 0.438*** 0.375***
(0.038) (0.032) (0.027) (0.025) (0.042) (0.035) (0.030) (0.027)
Only Importer in Euro Area 0.118*** 0.068* 0.066* -0.040 0.168*** 0.159*** 0.218*** 0.092**
(0.044) (0.039) (0.036) (0.034) (0.053) (0.045) (0.040) (0.038)
Observations 126941 206686 336701 427421 199262 307342 480513 588643
R-squared 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96
Initial year in sample 1976 1976 1976 1976 1948 1948 1948 1948
Final year in sample 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005
Number of countries 70 100 150 205 70 100 150 205
Also included dummies for other free-trade agreements:
           US-Israel, US-Chile, NAFTA, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, EFTA, CAN, CACM, CER and AFTA
Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair) in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Only exporter is a member of an
EU - Euromed agreement
Only importer is a member of an
EU - Euromed agreement
Both countries are members of an 
EU association agreement
Only exporter is a member of an
EU association agreement
Only importer is a member of an 
EU association agreement
Both countries are members of an
EU - Euromed agreement
 
From the previous discussion, we know that the coefficients presented in tables 2 
and 3 are biased because of omitted variables —the price indices, Pet and Pit— which capture 
the effect of multilateral resistance and which are, by definition, correlated with bilateral trade 
resistance (teit). This bias is likely to be more acute for the coefficients presented in table 2 
where no effort is made to control for it, at least with time-invariant country dummies as in 
table 3 and in the previous literature. However, given that the theory predicts that these 
multilateral resistance terms are time-variant, even the coefficients presented in table 3 remain 
subject to potential biases. To be precise, a necessary condition for the results presented 
in table 3 to be biased is that the price indices of the different countries do not share a 
common time trend. If they did, no bias would result from the use of separate exporter, 
importer and time dummies since the first two would capture differences in the absolute 
levels of multilateral resistance while the third would capture their common time trend. 
Looking at the difference between coefficients in the same column in table 2 and 3 seems 
to imply that the multilateral resistance terms are indeed relevant, and their exclusion 
(at least as a country fixed effect) leads to significant bias. 
The coefficients from table 3 are largely consistent with previous estimates of the 
determinants of bilateral trade flows. In a paper that also studies the trade performance of 
Middle East and North African countries, Soderling (2005) finds very similar coefficients for the 
main variables such as distance, border (adjacency), and language. Likewise, Feenstra (2002) 
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finds an estimate for the effect of distance and of a land border on bilateral trade flows very 
similar to the ones we report in table 3. 
Given that we know that coefficients obtained from the estimation of equations (15) 
and (16) suffer from potential biases, we return to attempting a proper estimation of 
equation (9). Unfortunately, the use of 100 countries and 30 years of data would require the 
inclusion of over 6,000 dummies for the estimation, virtually making it computationally 
unfeasible.9 Therefore, we choose to keep 30 years of data and restrict the number of 
countries to the top 70 exporters in 2004, including all Euromed countries (even if they do not 
satisfy this criterion). An alternative specification we consider is the inclusion of country-time 
dummies defined alternatively as country-triennial or country-quinquennial dummies. These 
specifications have the advantage of reducing the number of dummy regressors to less than 
one third of those used in the original estimation. This allows us to increase our panel in both 
dimensions either with the inclusion of more countries or with the extension of the period 
considered. While these alternative specifications do not exactly capture the effect of exporter 
and importer time-varying price indexes (Pet and Pit), the associated estimation bias will 
presumably be much smaller than that of considering a single non-time-varying country 
dummy over the 30 years of the sample as we did when estimating equation (16). 
Table 4 presents a comparison of the parameter estimates for b and c in (9) using 
different samples and time spans for the definition of the country-time dummies. The first 
five columns in table 4 show the estimation of a gravity model for 70 countries using 
country-time dummies where these dummies remain fixed in intervals of one, three, five, six, 
and ten years, respectively. The next four columns increase the sample to 100 countries and 
show the results of the estimation with country-time dummies where these dummies remain 
fixed over three, five, six, and ten-year intervals. 
We can now return to our discussion about the effect of omitting the multilateral 
resistance effects on the estimation of a gravity equation. We have seen from the comparison 
of tables 2 and 3 that at least the inclusion of country fixed effects is warranted. If we 
compare tables 3 and 4 we can go even further and point to the importance of including 
time-varying multilateral resistance terms (i.e. country-year time dummies) to avoid estimation 
biases that appear to be especially relevant for time-varying regressors. It seems that 
the coefficients of country-pair-and-time-varying explanatory variables such as membership 
of an FTA or the euro area are very sensitive to the inclusion or not of time-varying 
multilateral resistance terms. For instance, the coefficient on both countries having signed 
an Euromed agreement is significantly negative in column 2 in table 3 (a regression with 
exporter and importer fixed effects for 100 countries over 30 years) implying a decline in 
trade of around 29%.10 However, the analog coefficients in columns 6 to 9 of table 4, which 
properly estimate the gravity equation (9) in a regression with the same sample but 
with exporter-year and importer-year dummies, are not statistically different from zero. 
Similar changes in parameter estimates are observable for other free trade agreements 
that we do not report in tables 2 through 4 since they are not the focus of this paper but that 
are available upon request. 
Turning to the different estimations in table 4, if we compare the first five columns, 
a few regularities emerge which deserve our attention. When comparing the coefficients of 
the exporter-importer characteristics (Zei) such as distance, the presence of a land border, 
or colonial relationships, we find that they are extremely robust across specifications. 
However, as we expected, the coefficients of those variables that capture exporter-importer 
characteristics that evolve over time (Zeit), namely free trade areas and currency unions, are 
                                                                          
9. 100 countries and 30 years of data imply the use of 3,000 dummies for exporters and another 3,000 for importers. 
10. The coefficient is -0.340 meaning that the impact on trade will be: e-0.340 – 1 = 28.81%. 
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quite sensitive to the type of specification that we use. Most coefficients have the expected 
signs and magnitudes, which are comparable to those previously found in the literature with 
the exception of the border effect, which is not significant in any of the specifications. 
However, when observing the coefficients for the 100-country sample in the last four columns 
of table 3, we observe the same regularities in terms of the robustness of coefficients on 
dynamic and static country-pair characteristics but the coefficient on the dummy for countries 
sharing a common border has a positive and significant sign. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of OLS regressions with country-period dummies for different 
period lengths (equation 9) 
 
OLS regressions
Including exporter-period and importer-period dummies
Dependent variable: Log of exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Distance (log) -1.328*** -1.327*** -1.326*** -1.326*** -1.326*** -1.318*** -1.316*** -1.316*** -1.315***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Common border dummy 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.321*** 0.324*** 0.323*** 0.328***
(0.113) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.108)
Ever in colonial relationship 0.795*** 0.795*** 0.795*** 0.795*** 0.797*** 1.059*** 1.062*** 1.062*** 1.064***
   dummy (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.101)
Common language dummy 0.516*** 0.517*** 0.517*** 0.518*** 0.515*** 0.422*** 0.421*** 0.422*** 0.419***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Common colonizer dummy 0.572*** 0.570*** 0.569*** 0.569*** 0.564*** 0.811*** 0.811*** 0.809*** 0.806***
(0.125) (0.124) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
Both countries in EU 3.079*** 0.528** 0.535** 0.350* 0.495*** 0.400* 0.406* 0.224 0.455***
(0.702) (0.220) (0.212) (0.184) (0.163) (0.234) (0.222) (0.199) (0.176)
Only exporter in EU 0.763 0.135 0.077 0.066 0.207** 0.318*** 0.201* 0.154 0.315***
(0.583) (0.118) (0.114) (0.097) (0.086) (0.121) (0.115) (0.099) (0.087)
Only importer in EU 2.030*** 0.123 0.177 0.010 -0.057 0.120 0.233** 0.107 0.105
(0.488) (0.120) (0.118) (0.101) (0.099) (0.123) (0.116) (0.102) (0.095)
-0.404*** -0.294** -0.341*** -0.185* -0.251** -0.272* -0.250* -0.101 -0.149
(0.152) (0.121) (0.117) (0.106) (0.098) (0.154) (0.143) (0.134) (0.119)
-2.837*** 0.171** 0.174** 0.202*** 0.107** 0.002 0.076 0.114* 0.046
(0.403) (0.071) (0.069) (0.061) (0.054) (0.081) (0.075) (0.068) (0.059)
3.016*** 0.107 0.058 0.180*** 0.218*** 0.024 -0.032 0.074 0.103
(0.413) (0.074) (0.072) (0.063) (0.064) (0.087) (0.078) (0.072) (0.065)
-0.238 -0.072 0.048 0.147 0.093 -0.157 -0.056 0.047 -0.020
(0.377) (0.178) (0.155) (0.130) (0.094) (0.162) (0.141) (0.117) (0.088)
0.466 0.163* 0.250*** 0.296*** 0.246*** 0.122 0.220*** 0.278*** 0.221***
(0.288) (0.098) (0.087) (0.074) (0.058) (0.090) (0.081) (0.068) (0.054)
-0.347 0.108 0.142* 0.193*** 0.237*** 0.123 0.128* 0.169*** 0.205***
(0.334) (0.093) (0.084) (0.071) (0.055) (0.084) (0.075) (0.063) (0.051)
Both countries in Euro Area 1.975*** -0.021 0.037 0.348*** 0.306*** -0.114 -0.072 0.265** 0.191**
(0.565) (0.140) (0.079) (0.100) (0.076) (0.139) (0.089) (0.119) (0.087)
Only exporter in Euro Area 1.265** 0.089 0.047** 0.210*** 0.206*** 0.053 0.052*** 0.185*** 0.216***
(0.588) (0.061) (0.019) (0.050) (0.021) (0.069) (0.018) (0.066) (0.020)
Only Importer in Euro Area 0.801** -0.015 0.088*** 0.235*** 0.277*** -0.007 0.044 0.243*** 0.217***
(0.317) (0.107) (0.030) (0.056) (0.029) (0.091) (0.027) (0.059) (0.026)
Observations 126941 126941 126941 126941 126941 206686 206686 206686 206686
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97
Initial year in sample 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976
Final year in sample 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005
Number of countries 70 70 70 70 70 100 100 100 100
Dummy length in years 1 3 5 6 10 3 5 6 10
Also included dummies for other free-trade agreements (US-Israel, US-Chile, NAFTA, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, EFTA, CAN, CACM, CER and AFTA)
Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair) in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Only exporter is a member of an
EU - Euromed agreement
Only importer is a member of an
EU - Euromed agreement
Both countries are members of an 
EU association agreement
Only exporter is a member of an
EU association agreement
Only importer is a member of an 
EU association agreement
Both countries are members of an
EU - Euromed agreement
 
Given the sensitivity of the results to our choices of sample and length of the periods 
over which the dummy variable remains constant, we select the specification with 100 
countries and country-triennial dummies (column 6 in table 4) as our preferred specification 
since it maximizes our sample while retaining time-varying multilateral resistance terms. 
In this specification, the coefficients on the time-constant determinants of bilateral trade 
flows are largely consistent with previous literature: the elasticity of trade volume to distance is 
around -1.3, the presence of a land border increases trade by about 38%, an effect quite 
close to that of sharing a common language. The existence of a past colonial relationship or 
sharing a common colonizer raises trade by about 188% and 125%, respectively. Turning 
our attention to our variables for regional free trade agreements, we find that accession to 
the EU significantly increases country flows among member countries albeit this does not 
seem to come at the expense of trade with other trading partners. Using the terminology 
described earlier in this section, we would say that the EU has created trade for their 
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members without causing any trade diversion. It has actually created trade also for those 
countries outside the EU. 
With respect to the Euromed agreements, we do not find evidence that they have 
increased the trade volumes of those countries that have signed them. We find, however, 
slightly significant evidence of exports originating in Euromed countries increasing as a result 
of the signing of the agreement. As one would expect given the absence of clear trade 
creation effects, we do not observe any trade diversion effects either. A perhaps surprising 
result in this specification is that the introduction of the Euro and its successive adoption by 
the rest of countries has not significantly increased trade among countries in the Euro area, 
beyond the positive trade effect of the EU. These results, however, need to be taken with 
caution, as there have been only a few years in our sample for which the Euromed 
agreements have been in place, and presumably there might be a lag between the signing of 
the agreement and its effect on trade volumes. A similar criticism could be applied to the 
effect of the euro on trade. 
3.3 Estimating export potentials in Euromed countries 
Once we have the parameter estimates from our preferred estimation (column 6 in table 4), 
we can compute the predicted value of exports for each country vis-à-vis the rest of countries 
in the sample, and compute the export share potential XeitPS, as specified in (13). We depict 
the evolution of export share potentials of the nine Euromed countries vis-à-vis the European 
Union, the United States and the rest of Euromed countries in figure 4. Table 5 provides more 
detailed information reporting the most positive and most negative export share potential 
(averaged over 2000-2005) for every Euromed exporter as a percentage of its total exports 
identifying, respectively, the lowest and the highest potentials for export growth. 
 
Figure 4: Export share potentials index 
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Note: These export share potentials are constructed using equation (13) and the results from our 
preferred specification with 100 countries and exporter-, importer-triennial dummies, from 1976 to 2005 
(column 6 of table 4). 
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Table 5: Largest and smallest export share potentials by country 
 
Difference between actual and predicted share of exports. Average 2000-2005
(in percentage of total exports)
Italy 7.67 Italy 7.29 United States 6.15
United States 7.36 Spain 2.21 Belgium 6.04
Brazil 5.49 Syria 1.78 Hong Kong 3.10
Canada 5.29 India 1.68 Netherlands 1.53
Turkey 3.49 Saudi Arabia 1.68 Brazil 1.12
Morocco -1.28 France -1.82 Turkey -0.38
Spain -1.30 Germany -2.46 Italy -1.01
United Kingdom -3.88 United States -2.64 Egypt -3.69
Germany -6.75 Israel -5.92 United Kingdom -4.14
France -12.72 United Kingdom -7.45 Jordan -18.78
Iraq 18.93 United Arab Emirates 10.56 Spain 7.44
United States 12.10 Switzerland 8.50 Germany 6.32
India 9.14 Saudi Arabia 5.15 Turkey 5.79
Saudi Arabia 5.31 Iraq 2.64 Switzerland 2.39
United Arab Emirates 3.17 Kuwait 2.48 Tunisia 1.41
Turkey -0.57 Italy -3.15 Japan -1.41
Germany -1.67 Germany -4.20 Belgium -2.05
Italy -1.78 Syria -7.30 Italy -3.35
United Kingdom -4.08 United States -8.19 Netherlands -3.38
Israel -53.92 France -11.29 United Kingdom -5.19
France 6.15 Germany 9.02 France 11.26
United Kingdom 3.22 Italy 7.69 Libya 3.86
India 2.93 Saudi Arabia 3.01 Belgium 2.57
Brazil 1.51 Turkey 2.97 Germany 2.01
Singapore 1.12 United Arab Emirates 2.80 Italy 1.46
Belgium -1.02 Japan -2.15 Japan -1.22
Algeria -1.58 Jordan -2.21 Netherlands -1.45
Germany -2.09 France -5.41 Algeria -1.61
Portugal -2.63 Lebanon -7.41 United Kingdom -1.90
United States -12.35 United States -8.07 United States -10.41
Top 5 countries (actual trade share above that predicted by gravity model)
Egypt Israel
Jordan
Algeria
Top 5 countries (actual trade share above that predicted by gravity model)
Bottom 5 countries (actual trade share below that predicted by gravity model)
LibyaLebanon
Top 5 countries (actual trade share above that predicted by gravity model)
Bottom 5 countries (actual trade share below that predicted by gravity model)
Bottom 5 countries (actual trade share below that predicted by gravity model)
Source: author's calculations based on OLS regression with 100 countries and exporter-, importer-
triennial dummies from 1976 to 2005 (column 6 of Table 4).
Syria TunisiaMorocco
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As explained in section 2.2, given our use of country-triennial dummies, we are 
unable to make assertions about the absolute level of trade since our country-time dummies 
capture perfectly each country’s aggregate trade volume every year (both as an exporter and 
as an importer). However, we believe that the computation of the export share potentials 
may give us an idea where a country could find it easier to increase its exports, especially if 
they are underrepresented relative to what the gravity model would predict. 
Figure 4 reveals some very interesting patterns. First, we observe that, among 
the Euromed countries, Algeria, Jordan and Lebanon’s share of exports to the European 
Union as a whole are below the predictions of our empirical model, although for Lebanon, the 
gap between actual and predicted export shares has been closing fast in the last 15 years. 
For the other countries in the Euromed group, export shares to the EU in the last 5 years have 
been at, or above, the predictions of the model, implying that fast export growth probably 
has to be found elsewhere or should, probably, come from individual EU countries 
with highly negative export share potential indices, as shown in table 5. Second, we observe 
that the actual export share to the United States is, in general, below the predictions of our 
empirical model, with few notable exceptions (Jordan, Algeria and Israel).11 Trade with the rest 
of Euromed countries does not seem to show a clear pattern neither above nor below our 
predictions with the exception of Israel and Jordan where the lack of trade with Euromed 
countries can be attributed almost entirely to the low level of their bilateral trade with each 
other. Finally, although not reported in figure 4 but apparent from table 5, those countries for 
which the US has an export share below the predicted one (and the EU’s actual export 
share is similar to the predicted one), the counterpart (that is, countries with an export share 
above that predicted by the model) seem to be concentrated on other Middle East countries 
outside the Euromed region, India, and Brazil. 
We find the results on the estimation of this export share potentials to be highly 
dependent on the estimation method used, since the estimated export share potentials 
can even reverse sign. We believe this points to the importance of properly identifying the 
gravity equation not only from an academic point of view but also from a policy-maker’s view 
as the policy implications derived in each case could even go in opposite directions. 
After examination of these export share potentials one natural question to ask is 
whether actual export shares below those predicted by our empirical model are a good 
indicator of the direction in which trade is more likely to increase in the near future. To answer 
this question, we regress the growth rate of each country’s bilateral exports on several 
controls as well as on (different lags of) our measure of export share potential. Formally, 
we estimate: 
,ln ln δ ε− −− = + + + + + +bZ cZeit ei t T PSeit T ei eit e i t eitx x X d d dT . (17) 
                                                                          
11. Péridy (2005b) also finds weak trade integration between the US and Middle East and North African countries, 
especially those in the Maghreb. Soderling (2005) goes a step further and, besides finding sizeable trade potentials 
of selected Euromed countries vis-à-vis the US, he also finds that exports to the EU are mostly in line with the 
predictions of a gravity model. Although their methodology does not fully take into account the aforementioned 
multilateral resistance effects, the coincidence of results with those in this section is striking. 
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A negative estimate of δ, the coefficient of export share potential, would indicate the 
existence of convergence meaning that a share of exports below that predicted by the gravity 
model is associated with higher future growth of exports precisely in that direction. 
We turn to the data and, indeed, find a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for our measure of export share potential (upper part of table 6). The negative 
sign is robust across different specifications as well as to the use of different lags for 
the estimation of this effect. Thus, our evidence suggests that those bilateral relationships 
in which a country is trading below the predictions of a well-specified gravity model present 
the best opportunities to increase its aggregate volume of trade. 
 
Table 6: Regressions of export volume growth over export share potentials 
(equation 17) 
 
OLS Regressions
Dependent variable is annualized growth rate of bilateral volume of exports (over different lengths of time)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Annualized 
export growth 
over one year
Annualized 
export growth 
over 2 years
Annualized 
export growth 
over 3 years
Annualized 
export growth 
over 4 years
Annualized 
export growth 
over 5 years
Export Share potential -0.830***
    (lagged 1 year) (0.095)
Export Share potential -0.615***
    (lagged 2 years) (0.055)
Export Share potential -0.442***
    (lagged 3 years) (0.043)
Export Share potential -0.370***
    (lagged 4 years) (0.038)
Export Share potential -0.318***
    (lagged 5 years) (0.033)
Distance (log) 0.004 0.028*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Common border dummy 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.003
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Ever in colonial relationship -0.032*** -0.040*** -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.028***
   dummy (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Common language dummy -0.001 -0.014*** -0.006** -0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Common colonizer dummy -0.022*** -0.040*** -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.018***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.382*** 0.154*** 0.056* 0.096*** 0.018
(0.064) (0.039) (0.034) (0.032) (0.026)
Observations 190760 165799 155951 146779 138141
R-squared 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11
Initial year in sample 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976
Last year in sample 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005
Number of countries 102 102 102 102 102
Dummy length in years 3 3 3 3 3
Also included (but not reported) are dummy variables for trade creation and diversion following trade agreement
and currency unions as well as exporter, importer, and year dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have estimated trade potentials stemming from a gravity equation, 
taking into account and correcting for the potential bias resulting from the omission of 
exporter and importer countries’ price levels, which capture trade resistance with respect 
to all its trading partners, as pointed out by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). We find 
that accounting for the potentially diverging evolution of these price indices for each 
country in our sample could lead to severe biases if these time-varying price indices 
were not taken into account. Due to computational limitations, we perform a gravity 
estimation using country-triennial dummies, instead of country-year dummies, which allow 
us to maximize our sample while retaining the country-specific time-varying component of 
the price indices. However, the use country-time dummies allows only for the estimation 
of in-sample trade potential, in spite of Egger’s (2002) critique and, more importantly, 
it limits our assessments about trade potentials to the geographic distribution of a country’s 
exports (export shares), instead of being able to make statements about their absolute 
levels, as it has usually been done in the literature. 
We find that the coefficient estimates of time-changing variables specific to a country 
pair (such as membership in various trade agreements or membership in a currency union) 
are quite sensitive to the inclusion of time-varying fixed effects. For instance, one of our 
coefficients of interest —the one for membership in an Euromed association agreement— 
which is negative in the specification with time-constant fixed effects turns non-significant 
when the proper (time-varying) fixed effects are used. We find this difference to also be 
important for the estimation of trade potentials which can differ significantly, even in their 
time trend, when comparing gravity models with or without country-time dummies, which 
account for overall trade resistance for each partner in a country pair. Even if overall trade 
potentials were not to change significantly across specifications that include country-time 
dummies (which they do), the correction of biases is crucial in order to correctly understand 
the marginal effects of the independent variables on the volume of trade, and thus be able to 
correctly advice on the best policy to promote trade in a particular country. 
With respect to Euromed countries, we find that previous analysis, which did not 
properly take into account overall multilateral trade resistance have tended to overestimate 
trade potentials for the region, leading to the conclusion that most countries in the area 
export too little, and should, therefore, promote trade. We show that these estimates are 
likely to be biased, and would thus be risky to use them for policy making. Our alternative 
approach, looking at export shares instead of levels, does not suffer from omitted variable 
bias and it is still able to offer some guidance on where it would be easier to increase exports: 
to those countries where actual export shares are below those predicted by the (correctly 
specified) gravity model. Our results show that most countries in the Euromed region (except 
Algeria, Jordan and Lebanon) seem to trade with the EU as a whole at or slightly above 
the predictions of the model, so that export growth is likely to come from other destinations 
or would probably come from individual EU countries with highly negative export share 
potential indices. The share of exports to the US, on the other hand, is below the predictions 
of our empirical model, with few notable exceptions (Jordan, Algeria and Israel). Intraregional 
trade among Euromed countries seem close to the predictions of the model, except for Israel 
and Lebanon, precisely for their relatively low bilateral trade among them. 
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In our empirical exercise, we also find that Euromed association agreements 
have not had a significantly positive effect on exports of signatory countries. We believe 
there might be two possible and complementary reasons for this. While it is true that 
Euromed agreements have gone a long way towards the liberalization of trade between 
both shores of the Mediterranean, it is also true that its implementation has been very 
gradual and that several restrictions are still in place, which might point to a relatively small 
effect so far. The other reason is that the exporting sector of these countries might only 
be slowly reacting to the opening of the new markets and that it might take a few years for 
the full effect to be observed. To address the first explanation, we would need to use a 
sectoral-level dataset to be matched with the actual decline in tariffs for each sector, which 
is in our future research agenda. For the second explanation, we would need to test the 
importance of hysteresis in trade flows, which would require the use of a dynamic model 
as well as some more years of data, to allow the potentially positive effects of Euromed 
association agreements on exports to be fully realized. 
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Data Appendix 
For this project, we have put together a dataset from a variety of different sources. The goal 
of this appendix is to describe this dataset. The dataset contains directional bilateral trade 
flows between for every country pair between 1948 and 2005 as well as characteristics that 
are specific to each country (GPD, area, etc.) or to the country pair (distance, presence 
of a common border, etc.). It is important to note that in this dataset, we use the term country 
a bit loosely since it refers to any possible trade origin or destination which reports their trade 
statistics to the IMF even if these entities are not formally defined as countries. For instance, 
Martinique and Guadeloupe correspond to countries in our dataset despite being two 
overseas departments of France.  
The dataset puts together data from very different sources and while every effort has 
been made to ensure its completeness and consistency, it is necessary to acknowledge 
that the quality and quantity of data available varies enormously across countries and time. 
Table 7 at the end of this appendix summarizes the sources and coverage of each variable. 
Trade Data. Unlike previous datasets, the one we have constructed uses 
directional bilateral trade flows. This means that for every country pair, we report at most 
two trade flows, one in each direction. We combine export and import data from the 
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) put forth by the IMF in order to maximize data availability. 
The value of exports from a given country (e) to another given country (i) is, thus, given by the 
average of reported exports from e to i and reported imports by i from e. Those observations 
for which either one of the values are missing are assigned the alternative (non-missing) value. 
Distance Data. We follow the approach in the literature and compute the 
bilateral distance using each country’s latitude and longitude12 and computing the great 
circle distance according to the formula: 
{ }arccos sin( ) sin( ) cos( ) cos( ) cos( )= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ −ei e i e i e idist r lat lat lat lat long long  
where r is the earth radius which is taken to be 6,356.75 km, late and longe correspond to 
the latitude and the longitude of the exporter and lati and longi are defined analogously. The 
latitude and longitude data were obtained from the CIA World Factbook and they correspond 
to the coordinates of the capital city in each country. 
Border Data. The border information was obtained from Glick and Rose (2002) and 
it is static in the sense that it does not change over time. This is due to the fact that, in most 
cases, changes in borders are associated with the creation of new countries. 
GDP Deflator. The GDP Deflator corresponds to the CPI as was obtained as the 
average of the four quarters in every given years from the chained series put forth 
by the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s FRED. 
GDP Data were obtained from the International Financial Statistics published by 
the IMF and complemented with data from the World Development Indicators published 
                                                                          
12. These data are not reported in the final dataset but are available from the authors. 
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by the World Bank. All GDP data are converted to USD using market exchange rates and 
deflated to constant 2000 US dollars using the CPI deflator. 
Population Data were obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
published by the World Bank. GDP and Population in the dataset are combined to generate 
the data on GDP per capita. 
Area and Coastline Data. These data were obtained from the CIA World Factbook. 
The data on the length of the coastline was adjusted as to not include coastline on the Arctic 
Ocean or to interior seas. 
Island and landlocked data. Other studies and datasets define these variables 
as the sum of the number of countries which meet said criterion for each country pair. 
Instead, we define two dummy variables, one for those cases in which the exporter meets the 
corresponding criterion and analogous variables for the importer. 
Language and Colonial Data. The data on colonial relationships was obtained 
from Glick and Rose (2002) and entails a dummy variable for whether the two countries 
(entities) were ever in a colonial relationship, a dummy variable for whether the two countries 
had the same colonizer, a dummy for whether the duration of the colonial relationship 
(in those case in which existed during the relevant sample), and a dummy to indicate entities 
which belong to the same country. The dummy for countries sharing a common language 
was also obtained from Glick & Rose. 
Religion Data. The index for religious similarity for the countries in each pair is 
similar to the one used by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007) and indicates the probability 
that a random person in the first country is the same religion as a random person in the 
second country in the pair. To construct this variable, we obtained the share of each of 
the major religious groups from the CIA World Factbook (Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, 
Buddhist, and Agnostic/Atheist) and computed said probability by combining the percentages 
of each of these groups for each country. Mathematically: 
religsimil christ christ muslim muslim jewish jewish
hindu hindu buddhist buddhist agnostic agnostic
= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
ei e i e i e i
e i e i e i
 
 
where each name of a religion followed by subscript e or i indicate the proportion of followers 
of that religion in the exporting (e) and the importing (i) country respectively. 
Free Trade Area (FTA) Data. We have constructed several variables to reflect 
the membership of countries to the main free trade areas. For each agreement, we have 
defined three variables which allow us to discern the trade creation and trade diversion 
effects of free trade areas. For instance, we have generated the variable FTA11 which takes a 
value of 1 if both countries in the pair are in the same free trade agreement. We have also 
generated the variables FTA10 and FTA01 which are dummy variables that take a value of 1 
when only the exporter or the importer (respectively) belong to a given trade agreement. 
Thus, we have defined three variables (XXX11, XXX10, and XXX01) for each free trade 
agreement: 
• EEC: Austria (1995), Belgium (1958), Cyprus (2004), Czech Republic (2004), 
Denmark (1973), Estonia (2004), Finland (1995), France (1958), Germany (1958), 
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Greece (1981), Hungary (2004), Ireland (1973), Italy (1958), Latvia (2004), Lithuania 
(2004), Luxembourg (1958), Malta (2004), Netherlands (1958), Poland (2004), 
Portugal (1986), Slovak Republic (2004), Slovenia (2004), Spain (1986), Sweden 
(1995), and United Kingdom (1973). 
• US-Chile (coded as USChile): United States (2004) and Chile (2004). 
• US-Israel (coded as USIsr): United States (1985) and Israel (1985). 
• NAFTA: United States (1994), Canada (1994), and Mexico (1994). 
• CARICOM: Antigua & Barbuda (1974), Bahamas (1983), Barbados (1973), Belize 
(1974), Dominica (1974), Grenada (1974), Guyana (1973), Haiti (2002), Jamaica 
(1973), Trinidad & Tobago (1973), and Suriname (1995), as well as some countries 
which are not in our sample due to lack of data: Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. 
Lucia, and St. Vincent & The Grenadines. 
• PATCRA: Australia (1977) and Papua New Guinea (1977). 
• Mercosur: Argentina (2001), Brazil (2001), Paraguay (2001), and Uruguay (2001). 
• EFTA: Iceland (1970), Norway (1960), Switzerland (1960), United Kingdom 
(1960-1973), Portugal (1960-1986), Austria (1960-1995), Finland (1961-1995), 
Denmark (1960-1973), and Sweden (1960-1995), as well as Liechtenstein which is 
not in our sample due to lack of data. 
• CAN: Bolivia (1993), Colombia (1993), Ecuador (1993), Peru (1993), and Venezuela 
(1993-2006). 
• CACM: Costa Rica (1963-1969; 1991-), El Salvador (1960-1969; 1991-), Guatemala 
(1960-1969; 1991-), and Honduras (1960-1969; 1991-), Nicaragua (1960-1969; 
1991-). 
• CER: Australia (1983) and New Zealand (1983). 
• AFTA: Brunei Darussalam (1992), Cambodia (1999), Indonesia (1992), Laos (1997), 
Malaysia (1997), Myanmar (1997), Philippines (1992), Singapore (1992), Thailand 
(1992), and Vietnam (1995). 
We have also included other free trade agreements which generally occur between a 
country and an existing free trade area and which generate hub-and-spoke relationships 
which need to be taken into account. For instance, despite Switzerland having signed a free 
trade agreement with the European Economic Community in 1973, and Mexico having signed 
a similar treaty in 2000, this does not mean that there is a free trade agreement between 
Switzerland and Mexico. This hub-and-spoke system is generally sustained thanks to the 
presence of rules of origins in goods that are subject to the free trade agreement. 
The agreements we have included in our dataset are: 
• Agreements with the EEC (coded as EEC_AA): Chile (2003), Croatia (2002), FYR 
Macedonia (2001), South Africa (2001), Mexico (2000), Bulgaria (1994), Faroe 
Islands (1997), Romania (1993), Turkey (1996), Switzerland (1973), and Iceland 
(1973). 
• Agreements with the EFTA (coded as EFTA_AA): Tunisia (2005), Chile (2004), 
Singapore (2003), Jordan (2002), Croatia (2002), Mexico (2001), Morocco (1999), 
Bulgaria (1993), Romania (1993), Israel (1993), Turkey (1992), and the FYR of 
Macedonia (2001). 
In the same structure as before, we have included the Euromediterranean 
agreements between the EEC and a group of Euromed countries (the so-called Barcelona 
Agreements): 
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• Euromed (coded as EEC_EM): Egypt (2004), Morocco (2000), Jordan (2002), Israel 
(2000), Tunisia (1998), Lebanon (2003), and Algeria (2005). 
Currency Unions Data. The original data on currency unions was obtained from 
Glick and Rose (2002), which included data up to 1997, and extended to 2005. We also 
include three dummy variables constructed in a similar fashion as the dummy variables for 
free trade areas to account for the Euro currency union, the so-called Eurozone. The three 
variables are Euro11 which is equal to 1 when both countries are members of the Eurozone in 
that given year, Euro10 which is equal to 1 when the exporter is but the importer is not 
a member of the Eurozone and Euro01 which is defined symmetrically. 
 
Table 7. Sources and coverage of dataset 
 
Variable Code Description Source Countries. Period 
Value value Value of trade from exporter to importer (thousands of 2000 USD) DOTS 205 1948-2005 
Distance distance Distance from exporter to importer (km) Own construction / CIA World Factbook 227 Static 
Border border = 1 if both countries share a land border Glick & Rose (2002) 259 Static 
GDP Deflator GDPDeflator US CPI GDP deflator (2000 = 100) FRED Common 1948-2005 
GDP egdp GDP of exporter (e)/importer (i) (in thousands of 2000 USD) IFS / WDI 188 1948-2005 
GDP per capita egdppc GDP per capita of exporter/importer (in thousands of 2000 USD) IFS / WDI 188 1960-2005 
Population epop Population of exporter or importer country (in thousands) WDI 199 1960-2005 
Area earea Area of exporter/importer (in km2) CIA World Factbook 202 Static 
Coastline ecoastlinekm Length of exporter/importer’s coastline (in km) CIA World Factbook 202 Static 
Island eisland = 1 if exporter/importer is an island Glick and Rose (2002) 259 Static 
Landlocked elandl = 1 if exporter/importer is landlocked Glick and Rose (2002) 259 Static 
Common country comctry = 1 if exporter and importer are in the same country Glick and Rose (2002) 259 Static 
Colony colony = 1 if exporter and importer were ever in a colonial relationship Glick and Rose (2002) 259 Static 
Common colonizer comcol = 1 if exporter and importer had the same colonizer Glick and Rose (2002) 259 Static 
Current colony curcol = 1 if exporter and importer are currently in a colonial relationship  259 1948-2005 
Common language Comlang = 1 if exporter and importer have a common official language Glick and Rose (2002) 259 Static 
Religious similarity religsimil Probability that a random person from exporter and a random person from 
importer have the same religion 
CIA World Factbook  163 Static 
FTA11 FTA11 = 1 if exporter and importer are in the same free trade area in the given year 205 1948-2005 
FTA10 FTA10 = 1 if exporter does belong to a given free trade area but importer does not. 205 1948-2005 
FTA01 FTA01 = 1 if exporter does not belong to a given free trade area but importer does. 
Own Construction / WTO 
205 1948-2005 
CU Cu = 1 if exporter and importer belong to the same currency union Own Construction / Glick and Rose (2002) 205 1948-2005 
Euro11 CU_euro11 = 1if exporter and importer have the Euro as their common currency Own Construction 205 1948-2005 
Euro10 CU_euro10 = 1 if exporter does belong to the Eurozone but importer does not Own Construction 205 1948-2005 
Euro01 CU_euro01 = 1 if exporter does not belong to the Eurozone but importer does Own Construction 205 1948-2005 
% Oil Eoil Share of oil in exporter’s total exports WDI 196 1960-2005 
% Ores Eore Share of ores and other ferrous materials in exporter’s total exports WDI 196 1960-2005 
% Manuf. Emfg Share of manufacturing in exporter’s total exports  WDI 196 1960-2005 
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